Risk and interaction aversion: screening mechanisms in the Prisoner's
  Dilemma game by Canova, Gabriel A. & Arenzon, J. J.
ar
X
iv
:1
70
8.
06
84
4v
1 
 [q
-b
io.
PE
]  
22
 A
ug
 20
17
Risk and interaction aversion: screening mechanisms in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game
Gabriel A. Canova1 and Jeferson J. Arenzon1
1Instituto de F´ısica, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, CP 15051, 91501-970 Porto Alegre RS, Brazil
(Dated: November 7, 2018)
When the interactions between cooperators (C) and defectors (D) can be partially avoided within
a population, there may be an overall enhancement of cooperation. One example of such screening
mechanism occurs in the presence of risk-averse agents (loners, L) that are neutral towards others,
i.e., both L and its opponent, whatever its strategy, receive the same payoff. Their presence in the
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game sustains the coexistence of cooperators and defectors far beyond the
level attained in their absence. Another screening mechanism is a heterogeneous landscape obtained,
for example, by site diluting the lattice. In this case, cooperation is enhanced with some fraction of
such inactive, interaction-averse sites. By considering the interplay of both mechanisms, we show
that there is an explosive increase in the range of densities, just above the percolation threshold,
where neutrality is prevented and loners become extinct, the behavior reverting to the pure PD
game. Interestingly, this occurs despite defectors being usually abundant in that region. This has
to be compared with the corresponding loner-free region in the undiluted case that, besides being
very small, is dominated by cooperators.
I. INTRODUCTION
Risk-sensing is a useful resource [1–4] while foraging in
changing environments or when deciding the best strat-
egy during a dispute. When participation is not compul-
sory, withdrawing from a conflict may have several pur-
poses [1], like an easy way out, the imposition of some
punishment to the opponent or just avoiding a costly
situation [5]. Evolutionary game theory offers the frame-
work to analyze such conflicting situations as they ap-
pear in social dilemmas. In this context, the Prisoner’s
Dilemma (PD) game sets the paradigm to study how
cooperative behavior is seeded and sustained in a popu-
lation of cooperators (C) and defectors (D) [6–11]. As-
sociated with the strategies available for the individuals,
there is a payoff that depends on the frequency of other
strategies and is directly connected with the fitness, the
measure of reproductive success of an individual. De-
pending on the strategies chosen by two interacting play-
ers, each one receives a payoff that may further affect the
temporal evolution of their relative distribution. When
both collaborate, each one receives a unitary payoff. Mu-
tual defection earns both a zero payoff, while a defector
obtains 1 < b < 2 against a cooperator that, instead, re-
ceives nothing. Nonetheless, the fear of being exploited
or involved on a risky situation may prompt some agents
to avoid playing by the above rules while agreeing on a
small payoff σ shared with their opponent. With volun-
tary participation, a risk averse strategy named loner (L)
has been considered both in pairwise [12–16] and multi-
player [17–21] contests (another possibility is to use part
of the resources to obtain information about the oppo-
nent and avoid the conflict accordingly [22]). When pair-
ing is correlated (i.e., on networks [13–15], in opposi-
tion to fully mixed systems) because of the correspond-
ing payoffs, the presence of loners diminishes the preda-
tory power of defectors and is indeed an effective strat-
egy against them. However, cyclic dominance [8, 23, 24]
emerges once loners can, in turn, be invaded by cooper-
ators, even if not explicitly embedded in the payoff ma-
trix [13, 17, 19, 25]. Such cyclic competition is usually as-
sociated with intransitive interactions present in trophic
food webs with three or more competing species or strate-
gies (like the Rock-Paper-Scissors game, RPS, and its
generalizations [8, 23, 24]), but it is known to appear in
several different contexts. Intransitivity decreases, some-
times eliminates, the hierarchy among the trophic levels,
thus helping to sustain or enhance coexistence and, as a
consequence, biodiversity may persist [8, 23–25]. Analo-
gously, in the PD game with voluntary participation, be-
cause of the emergent cyclic dominance, cooperation can
be sustained even when the temptation to defect (b) is
large. In particular, Szabo´ and Hauert [13] showed that
on a square lattice, loners persistently coexist with co-
operators and defectors when b >∼ 1.026, screening their
mutual interactions and allowing cooperation to survive
up to b = 2. In the tiny interval 1 < b <∼ 1.026, loners are
suppressed and the standard, two strategies PD game is
recovered.
Another screening mechanism known to enhance co-
operation is the heterogeneous landscape produced by
randomly diluting the lattice upon which the dynam-
ics unfolds [26]. In this case, some patches are perma-
nently voided, offering natural defenses to avoid defection
(empty sites may also be interpreted as non-interacting
agents, stubborn zealots who receive null payoff and are
refractory to the game). Some amount of dilution is
known to increase the fraction of cooperators within a
population [26–30], with its peak approaching the ran-
dom site percolation threshold as the temptation gets
closer to the maximum value still allowing cooperation.
The reason is that, as the conditions become harsher for
cooperators when b increases, the smaller connectivity
provided by the fractal network close to the percolation
threshold prevents defectors from disrupting the clusters
of Cs. Once the network is not fully populated, agents
may take advantage of the free space and move. In the
RPS game, mobility is known to jeopardize the coex-
2istence of the three strategies above a certain thresh-
old [31], while for the spatial PD game there are scenarios
where it sustains cooperation [32, 33] (despite the inher-
ent difficulties both to be performed and compared with
the models, initial experiments with humans [34] had not
detected any effects of mobility). It is thus important to
understand, in this case in which cyclic behavior is not
explicitly embedded into the payoff or interaction ma-
trix, whether the behavior displayed in the regular lat-
tice is robust against dilution and mobility. A first step
would be the introduction of simple, random mobility
on the available space [32, 33]. From that, more complex
movement strategies [35–46] may evolve, probably requir-
ing higher cognitive skills. As an application, such sim-
ple models of mobile particles help to better understand
the complex behavior of collectively organized robots and
other self-propelled particles through disordered environ-
ments [47]. Thus, the main question dealt with in this
paper is whether and under which conditions the coex-
istence of all three strategies is possible and the density
of cooperators enhanced when the screening mechanisms
discussed above are both present and mobility is, even-
tually, included. Other forms of disorder have also been
considered, for example, in the invasion rates [48, 49].
The paper is organized as follows. We summarize
the model and give some details of the simulation in
Sect. II. Then, in Sect. III we present results for disor-
dered environments in the absence (Sect. III A) or pres-
ence (Sect. III B) of mobility. Finally, we discuss these
results and present our conclusions in Sec. IV.
II. MODEL
In the PD game with the loner strategy, the benefit
from withdrawing participation (σ) is worse than what
is received from mutual cooperation, yet better than the
punishment for mutual defection, i.e., 0 < σ < 1. The
payoff matrix is given by


C D L
C 1 0 σ
D b 0 σ
L σ σ σ

. (1)
The interactions between cooperators and defectors cor-
respond to the weak version of the PD game, leaving b,
the temptation to defect, as a further parameter. Cyclic
dominance is not directly embedded in the payoff ma-
trix [13] since loners, whether interacting with either co-
operators or defectors, receive the same payoff.
We consider a square lattice, with linear size L and
periodic boundary conditions. Initially, each site has an
equal probability ρ/3 of being C, D or L, where 0 < ρ ≤ 1
is the overall lattice occupation. In each round, after
accumulating the payoffs from the interactions with all
its nearest neighbors, player i randomly chooses one of
them, say j, and, if occupied, tries to copy its strategy
with probability
w(Si ← Sj) =
1
1 + e(Pi−Pj)/K
, (2)
where Pi and Pj are, respectively, the payoffs obtained
by strategies Si and Sj, and K is a (small) noise allow-
ing irrational choices (we take K = 0.1 hereafter). This
updating rule is synchronously applied on all players at
each (Monte Carlo) step and keeps ρ unchanged. Paral-
lel updating allows us to take full advantage of the GPU
computing power whose details are discussed in the Ap-
pendix A (see also Ref. [50]). Since the results for ρ = 1
are qualitatively the same as those obtained in Ref. [13]
with a serial dynamics, the model seems robust against
the details of the dynamics. Mobility is also considered,
depending on the existence of neighboring empty sites.
After the updating process, each individual randomly
chooses a nearest neighbor site and, if empty, switches
position with it with probability m [32]. We consider
the simplest mobility scenario not requiring any particu-
lar skills of the agents. In this way, mobility is unbiased
(purely random), non assortative and homogeneous (site
and strategy independent).
The use of GPUs allows the Monte Carlo simulations
to be performed using very large linear system sizes (up
to L = 2048). Averages were taken after the system
reached the stationary state with error bars smaller than
the symbol sizes. When there is diffusion or the system is
large enough (self averaging), the temporal average seems
to be enough.
III. RESULTS
When a fraction 1 − ρ of random sites is kept empty
throughout the dynamics, the asymptotic fraction of each
strategy becomes density dependent [26]. In the next
section we discuss the combined effects of the screening
mechanisms mentioned in the Introduction on the popu-
lation of cooperators, defectors and loners.
A. Disordered Environments
Fig. 1 shows the temporal evolution of the fraction of
each strategy when b = 1.4, σ = 0.3 and different densi-
ties, ρ = 1 (top) and 0.75 (bottom panel). The fraction
of the strategy i is the ratio between its density ρi and ρ,
fi ≡ ρi/ρ. The cyclic dominance induced by the payoff
matrix is manifested locally, in each occupied site, as the
strategies tend to replace each other as L → D → C →
L. On a global level, although the densities initially oscil-
late with a macroscopic amplitude, the local oscillators
are soon driven out of phase, because the interactions
are short ranged, and the amplitude decreases while the
orbit remains close to the fixed points (some low am-
plitude fluctuations, due to noise, persist). The defects
3introduced in the lattice when ρ < 1 have an important
role in damping the initial oscillations. While for ρ = 1
the oscillations seem underdamped, for ρ = 0.75 they
are apparently critically damped. In the absence of long
range interactions, global synchronization does not occur
in this model [14], much akin to related epidemic [51] or
many species cyclic games [52–55].
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FIG. 1: Normalized fraction of cooperators (blue, solid line),
defectors (red, dashed line) and loners (green, dotted line) as
a function of time for b = 1.4, σ = 0.3 and two densities:
ρ = 1 (top panel) and ρ = 0.75 (bottom panel).
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FIG. 2: Average asymptotic fraction of each strategy as a
function of ρ for different values of b and σ = 0.3. From
top to bottom: a) cooperators, b) defectors and c) loners.
The vertical dotted line locates the random site percolation
threshold, ρp ≃ 0.59 for a square lattice [56].
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FIG. 3: Average asymptotic fraction of the three strategies
as a function of b for different values of ρ and σ = 0.3. The
thick solid lines, for values of b close to 1, show the average
fraction of cooperators when there are no loners in the initial
state. Inside the shaded region, whose size is much enlarged
for ρp < ρ <∼ 0.7, the loners present at t = 0 soon become
extinct and the behavior reduces to the pure PD game (the
solid, thick line).
When there are no loners in the initial state and b is
small enough, the fraction of cooperators, fC, has a max-
imum at an intermediate density ρ [26], showing that
some amount of dilution enhances cooperation (see the
b = 1.01 curve in the top panel of Fig. 2) by provid-
ing a screening mechanism between cooperators and de-
fectors. When b gets close to the point beyond which
defectors completely invade the system, the position of
the peak seems to approach the random site percolation
threshold [27], ρp ≃ 0.59 for the square lattice [56] with
a dynamics allowing irrational behavior, Eq. (2). Coop-
erators are more easily outperformed by defectors as b
increases and, in order to protect themselves, groups of
Cs should decrease the surface of contact with defectors.
Such conditions appear close to ρp where the underlying,
largest cluster is fractal. As discussed in the introduc-
tion, loners also play a screening role, preventing cooper-
ators and defectors from playing the game. When loners
are initially present and ρ = 1, we reproduce the results
of Szabo´ and Hauert [13] (with small quantitative differ-
ences due to the parallel dynamics). In this case, Fig. 3
(top), loners disappear for b <∼ 1.013 and within the tiny
interval 1 < b <∼ 1.013, the original PD outcome is recov-
ered (shaded interval). However, beyond that interval,
and up to b = 2, cooperators survive in the presence of
4both loners and defectors. In this range, both fC and
fD decrease while fL increases. In particular, as b ap-
proaches the critical value from above [13], fL vanishes
with an exponent β ≃ 0.58, very close to the directed
percolation (DP) universality class [57] (interestingly, for
ρ not far from unity we still find exponents compatible
with the DP universality class, although this is not ex-
pected in the presence of quenched disorder). Dilution
dramatically changes the value of b above which loners
are able to survive in the population. Down to ρ ≃ 0.7,
the effect is small (compare, for example, the size of the
shaded regions in Fig. 3). Then, there is an explosive in-
crease and the loner-free region becomes very large (e.g.,
up to b ≃ 1.5 for ρ = 0.65, bottom panel of Fig. 3). In
all three panels, below this value (shaded region), loners
do not persist and, interestingly, the asymptotic fraction
of cooperators is almost identical to the one obtained
with loners absent already in the initial state (solid thick
lines), i.e., the initial presence of loners does not change
the asymptotic density, despite the strong transient os-
cillations (Fig. 1). In the region indicated by II in the
phase diagram Fig. 4, the behavior is thus identical to
the pure, loner-free PD game. In other words, on a di-
luted lattice, there is a rather broad range of densities,
ρp < ρ <∼ 0.7, right above the percolation threshold (i.e.,
a landscape still connected) where neutral strategies are
inhibited and become extinct, the behavior reducing to
the standard PD game. The behavior of fC becomes non-
monotonic (see, for example, the bottom panel of Fig. 3,
for which there is even a local optimum around b ≃ 1.7).
Interestingly, for ρp < ρ <∼ 0.7, cooperators reappear,
after being suppressed in region II, when conditions be-
come more favorable to defectors, i.e., as b increases.
More specifically, the behavior of fi as a function of
ρ is shown in Fig. 2. For ρ → 0 all occupied sites are
isolated and keep the strategy initially assigned to them,
i.e., fi = 1/3, ∀i. For values of ρ well below the perco-
lation threshold, the system is divided into small, inde-
pendent clusters whose fate depends essentially on their
initial composition [26]: both fC and fD initially decrease
as ρ increases, while loners inside these small clusters are
more successful and fL increases. In this region, labeled
III in Fig. 4 and limited from above by ρp, the system at-
tains an inactive, static pattern without sites that change
strategy, as shown in Fig. 5, with the possible exception
of a few blinkers. Upon further increasing ρ, a strong
dependence on b appears, with interesting characteris-
tics close to and above the percolation threshold ρp. For
ρ ≥ ρp, loners survive on the percolating cluster only in
phase I, while they are strongly suppressed in phase II
(where they may survive in some of the small, isolated
clusters coexisting with the percolating one). Once inside
phase I, loners also become active, fL resumes growing
with its density being correlated with its activity. Above
the value of b where phase II disappears, there remains
a minimum of fL at ρp (see, e.g., the case b = 1.8 in
Fig. 2c), indicating that loners thrive better in a com-
pact environment, the fractal nature of the percolating
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FIG. 4: Phase diagram with the fraction of cooperators (color
code) in the temptation b versus density ρ plane. The solid
lines divide the diagram into three regions with different
regimes. In region III, 0 ≤ ρ <∼ ρp ≃ 0.59, no activity persists
and there is no giant, percolating cluster and the three strate-
gies survive in small, independent clusters. In region I, loners
coexist with cooperators and defectors and a finite fraction of
agents change strategy at each step (active sites). In region
II, instead, loners become extinct and the behavior reduces to
the pure PD game. The dotted lines, both above and below
ρp, correspond to the maximum local value of fC.
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FIG. 5: Fraction of active cooperators (top) and loners (bot-
tom). Defectors (not shown) behave in a similar way to coop-
erators. Notice that below the random site percolation thresh-
old (ρp ≃ 0.59, vertical dotted line [56]), there are no active
strategies whatsoever.
While dilution may enhance cooperation in both two
and three strategies games, the precise dependence of the
optimal density on ρ is now more complex. Indeed, as
b increases from 1, the peak of cooperators shrinks and
move to the left, toward ρp (see Fig. 2a). However, dif-
5ferently from the case without loners [27], the peak does
not monotonously converge to ρp but, instead, continues
into the ρ < ρp region while also decreasing in height
(see, e.g., the b = 1.06 case in Fig. 2a). In addition, a
second peak develops inside phase I and also approaches
ρp (from above) as b → 2. Both peaks are shown as
dotted lines in Fig. 4. Loners thus affect the subcriti-
cal clusters below ρp, reducing the presence of defectors
and allowing cooperators control those large, but finite
domains in that region.
Finally, another interesting feature can be observed for
large values of b (e.g., b = 1.8 in Fig. 2b). Almost every-
where above ρp, the density of defectors is essentially flat
The frequency of loners increases as the lattice becomes
more populated, while the frequency of their predators
(the cooperators) decreases, what is reminiscent of the
survival of the weakest effect [58].
B. Mobility
Mobility does not need to be uncorrelated with strat-
egy, payoff, environment, expectations, etc, although the
simplest case of random diffusion settles the background
against which to compare other possible scenarios. In
particular, it may be even independent of the occupa-
tion ρ of the lattice if implemented through, for example,
the swapping of two neighboring strategies. Nonetheless,
we here explicitly consider a rule allowing only diffusive
steps toward empty sites in order to better understand
the role of the disordered environment on the behavior
of the model. Results for non-assortative, homogeneous
random diffusion are shown in Fig. 6 for b = 1.4, σ = 0.3
and several values of the mobilitym (including the highly
viscous, m = 0 case, solid lines, for comparison). Al-
though the behavior for m = 0 strongly depends on the
value of b, once mobility is included it becomes more ho-
mogeneous, with small quantitative differences. When
the mobility is small, cooperation levels increase in the
regions previously occupied by phases II and III, while
remaining almost the same in phase I. In almost all cases,
fC and fD decrease as m increases. Interestingly, loners
seem to benefit from high levels of mobility. In particu-
lar fL is an almost monotonously increasing function of
m for all densities (except for extremely low m). Fig. 7
shows the average fraction of active loners for different
values of b. For m = 0, phase I was characterized by the
presence of all three strategies being active, while in II
and III loners were either not present or inactive. For
m > 0, there is no longer such distinction and the active
coexistence extends down to very low densities, even be-
low the percolation threshold (for very low densities data
is not shown because it takes takes too long to reach the
steady state). Diffusion seems to be, therefore, beneficial
to the maintenance of coexistence.
Interestingly, for low densities (and m > 0) there is a
sea of loners where small and isolated groups of coopera-
tors concentrate on larger metadomains that are swapped
by invading waves of defectors. The absence of the reas-
suring effects of large groups of cooperators in this regime
is the associated risky condition that benefits the loner
strategy. In this scenario of small clusters, changing the
value of m only slightly change the average frequency of
each specie. For very low densities (in the range ρ ≃ 0.15
and below) it becomes very easy to be absorbed after
an extinction due to demographic stochasticity of finite
systems.
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FIG. 6: Fraction of cooperators (a), defectors (b) and loners
(c) as a function of ρ for b = 1.4, σ = 0.3 and several values
of the mobility m. The solid lines, for comparison, are for
m = 0, Fig. 2. The behavior is qualitatively the same for
others values of b as long as m > 0.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Game theory gained its evolutionary version once the
more effective scale of selection, the individual, was
clearly identified [59] (it is possible, nonetheless, to argue
for higher levels of selection [60, 61]). Differently from
the applications of game theory in economy, the decision
process is now ruled by natural selection based on the in-
dividual behaviors (strategies) of all agents. Specifically,
selection is frequency-dependent and acts on the phe-
notype characteristics, often neglecting any underlying
genetic mechanisms. The problem of the persistence of
cooperation has been challenging science for decades [62]
and many mechanisms have been proposed and tested ex-
perimental and numerically. When participation is vol-
untary, agents that are risk-averse may avoid the com-
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transition between phases I and II disappears.
petition and deter exploitation by assuming a neutral
(loner) strategy whose payoff is independent of the strat-
egy of the opponent. Such neutrality, amidst a popula-
tion, acts as a screening mechanism that decreases the
average strength of the actual PD interactions. Further
screening is obtained by considering disordered environ-
ments through a diluted lattice, where empty sites may
be interpreted as interaction-averse agents. Once space
is available, avoiding the game may also be achieved by
moving away from the opponent. We here combined such
mechanisms, and study the effects of disordered environ-
ments (random dilution) and mobility on the PD game
with loners, cooperators and defectors. The correspond-
ing payoff matrix, Eq. (1), induces a cyclic behavior, sim-
ilar to the Rock-Scissors-Paper game, where loners prey
on defectors that prey on cooperators that, in turn, prey
on loners. Such mechanism is known to reduce the hierar-
chy among the strategies, leading to coexistence. Thus,
besides the formation of groups as the survival mecha-
nism of cooperators in a spatial setup, in the presence of
loners, cyclic competition is a further resource enhanc-
ing diversity and sustaining cooperation. Moreover, in
the original PD game, dilution along with an increasing
temptation to defect pushes the optimal conditions for
cooperators toward the percolation threshold because the
existence of a giant, non-compact cluster provides enough
support for cooperators to thrive while its filamentous
nature prevents an efficient exploitation by defectors. In
the undiluted case, ρ = 1, there is a tiny interval of b that
suppresses loners but outside it, they sustain cooperators
in the whole interval of b. The main result shown here is
that, in the presence of dilution (on a broad range close
to ρp), there is an explosive increase in the region (II) ex-
cluding neutral strategies. Importantly, most of phase II
is defector rich. As a consequence, loners become extinct
in that region not because preys are absent or reduced
in number (as the result for ρ = 1 might have implied)
but due to a different mechanism, directly related to the
diluted lattice. We verified that this explosive expansion
of the pure PD phase also appears in other geometries
(random graph, honeycomb and triangular lattices).
The behavior in region II originates from how the in-
terfaces between strategies respond differently to the pin-
ning effects of dilution. While the velocity of a flat inter-
face separating loners from cooperators or defectors does
not depend, obviously, on b and is barely affected by the
empty sites, an interface between Cs and Ds increases
its velocity with b and becomes pinned if the dilution is
high (or K = 0). The smaller b is, the larger is the num-
ber of neighboring cooperators that the defector needs,
and the behavior of the defector invasion front is remi-
niscent of the partially directed percolation problem [63],
albeit the situation here is more complicated due to two
reasons. First, because of the random initial state, each
interface is directed differently. Second, for an invading
front, only the sites with the prey strategy are relevant,
the others (including the empty sites) only disrupt the
movement. Because of that, the transition to phase II
occurs at a value slightly larger than the partially di-
rected percolation threshold, ρpDP ≃ 0.64 [63]. Together,
just above the percolation threshold (still high dilution)
and b not so large, i.e., region II, these effects make the
domain interfaces between cooperators and defectors al-
most immobile. The interfaces between loners and de-
fectors, however, are still mobile and survive inside the
clusters of the latter as long as they are reasonably large
and interconnected. But in region II these clusters be-
come small and disconnected, leading to the extinction
of loners.
Under more realistic conditions, dilution is not ex-
pected to be spatially uncorrelated. In those cases, corre-
lated [64] rather than random percolation should be more
relevant, along with mobility being a further essential in-
gredient for agents to self-organize in patchy communi-
ties. Movement through the available space was consid-
ered here with agents jumping to neighboring empty sites
with probability m, independently of their strategy, i.e.,
homogeneous, purely random, non assortative diffusion.
Nonetheless, being another mechanism to avoid risk, it
is possible to have heterogeneous, somewhat assortative
mobility [65], with loners having a different probability,
mL, than the other agents. In one extreme case, loners
may avoid risk by drifting away from their non-loners,
immobile neighbors (m = 0, mL 6= 0), what can be in-
terpreted as fleeing from risky situations without helping
others [66] or, alternatively, as a punishment for not com-
plying with the social norm and, consequently, being ex-
pelled. In the other extreme, m 6= 0 and mL = 0, loners
do not care much about their neighborhood and stay put
7while the other strategies may move. Obviously, inter-
mediate cases are possible as well. A similarly heteroge-
neous mobility among cooperators, defectors and loners,
but hybrid between random and driven, was also con-
sidered in Ref. [67] in the context of the Public Goods
Game. As originally discussed in Ref. [32], once agents
are able to diffuse they may evolve more sophisticated
mobility forms, no longer purely random but, perhaps,
with strategy, payoff, neighborhood, history, etc, depen-
dence. It would be also interesting to include other coex-
isting strategies, like the Tit-for-Tat or a more tolerant
version [68] of the pure loner considered here. One still
open question is how similar this system is to cyclic com-
petition models that go beyond the RSP game with more
complex, multi-looped food webs [8, 24] (where another
coexistence mechanism, defensive alliances, becomes im-
portant) and whether the pure PD phase obtained here in
the presence of dilution is a consequence of the neutrality
of loners or another mechanism.
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Appendix A: GPU computing
The Monte Carlo simulations were implemented on a
square lattice with periodic boundary conditions. The
strategy on each lattice site is represented by the variable
si = 0, . . . , 3 corresponding, respectively, to an empty
site, cooperator (C), defector (D) and loner (L). For a
given total density ρ, to each site a random strategy is
initially assigned with probability ρ/3. The combat, the
first step of each round, where all agents interact with
their nearest neighbors, is easily done in parallel since ev-
ery player gets its payoff independently from each other.
During the selection step, each individual randomly
chooses one of its neighbors and changes its strategy ac-
cordingly with the dynamic rule Eq. (2). First, to avoid
memory overwrite, the state s is saved and then each
site runs at parallel (attempts to optimize the mem-
ory read efficiency by copying blocks of the strategies
to the shared memory have been fruitless). It is worth
mentioning that the computationally expensive evalua-
tion of the exponential in Eq. (2) can be avoided by
noticing that e(Mi−Mj)/K = eMi/K/eMj/K , then we
can write eMi/K = eME/K .eMW /K .eMN/K .eMS/K , where
ME,MW , . . . are the pairwise payoffs from the i neighbor-
ing sites. Therefore, we can pre-evaluate those pairwise
interactions and save them into an array P (si, sj) in the
constant memory. Finally, one can write
e(Mi−Mj)/K =
Π4k=0P (si, sk)
Π4l=0P (sj , sl)
, (A1)
where k e l run over the i and j neighborhood, respec-
tively.
To proceed with the parallel diffusion, three consecu-
tive steps are necessary. First, each player chooses, with
probabilitym, one of its neighboring sites (empty or not)
as a possible destination, Fig. 8a. Then, every site on the
lattice, with the information of those neighbors that are
attempting to occupy it, randomly chooses one of the
contenders (when there is more than one). At last, the
lattice is divided into sublattices, the chessboard pattern
in Fig. 8b. As a first movement, the white empty sites
let the chosen individuals standing on the black ones mi-
grate to them. In the next turn, the black sites repeat
the process.
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FIG. 8: (Left) With probability m, each player chooses a
destination to migrate. (Right) The white (black) empty sites
are occupied by players coming from the black (white) sites.
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